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1. 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
2. FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF
2003, at 3-4 (2005) [hereinafter FTC AGREEMENTS REPORT 2005], available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/2006/04/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf (noting that no known settlements involving
both restrictions on generic entry and compensation to the generic manufacturer were entered
into during the period between the FTC’s announcement of its investigation into the practice
in 1999 through 2004, but three emerged in 2005); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS
FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, at 1-5 (2006) [hereinafter FTC
AGREEMENTS REPORT 2006], available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/mmact/MMAreport2006.
pdf (noting that in 2006 there were fourteen final settlements between branded and generic
manufacturers that involved restrictions on generic entry and compensation to the generic).
3. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21,
28 & 35 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
4. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2006)
(settlement agreement involved $66.4 million payment from patent holder to generic company
and generic’s supplier); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th
Cir. 2003) (settlement agreements involved payments of up to $2 million per month to one
generic manufacturer and $4.5 million per month to second generic manufacturer from patent
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I. Introduction
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been battling pharmaceutical
manufacturers for almost a decade over massive reverse payment settlements
that the FTC found to unfairly restrict generic entry into the marketplace, and
the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in FTC v. Schering-Plough1 has led to
the recent resurgence of reverse payment settlements within the industry.2
Patent infringement settlements typically involve payment from the infringer
to the patent holder, but reverse payment settlements, sometimes referred to as
pay for delay, exit, or exclusion payment settlements, result in payments from
the patent holder to the infringer.  Patents play a major role in the
pharmaceutical industry, and the Hatch-Waxman Act regulates the entry of new
generic drugs into the marketplace.  Provisions within the Hatch-Waxman Act
provide generic drug manufacturers special methods to challenge the patents of
brand-name drugs to gain market access prior to the patent lapsing.3  To protect
the patent monopoly, reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical
industry result in the brand-name patent holder paying millions of dollars to the
potential generic patent infringer.4  The FTC and consumer groups attack these
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holder); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2003) (settlement
agreement resulted in $89.83 million payment from patent holder to generic); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(settlement agreement included $49.1 million payment from patent holder to generic and
approximately $350 million payment for not supplying generics with supply of patent holder’s
drug to market as generic under separate supply settlement agreement).
5. See, e.g., Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193-94; Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300; Cardizem, 332
F.3d at 903; In re Ciprofloxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
6. See, e.g., Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193-94; Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300; Cardizem, 332
F.3d at 903; In re Ciprofloxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
7. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. C-4076, 2003 WL 21008622 (Fed. Trade
Comm’n Apr. 14, 2003) (complaint & decision and order); Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297,
2001 WL 418903 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Apr. 2, 2001) (complaint); Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., No. 9293, 2000 WL 1744889 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Nov. 28, 2000) (consent order); Abbott
Labs., No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848 (Fed. Trade Comm’n May 22, 2000) (complaint &
decision and order); Abbott Labs., No. C-3946, 2000 WL 681849 (Fed. Trade Comm’n May
22, 2000) (complaint & decision and order).
8. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2000 WL 21008622 (complaint & decision and
order); Schering-Plough Corp., 2001 WL 418903 (complaint); Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
2000 WL 1744889 (consent order); Abbott Labs., 2000 WL 681848 (complaint & decision and
order); Abbott Labs., 2000 WL 681849 (complaint & decision and order).
9. Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896.
10. Id. at 905-15.  The Sherman Antitrust Act makes illegal actions of parties that would
restrain trade or commerce and attempts by individuals or groups to establish a monopoly.  15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
reverse payment settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical
companies as anticompetitive under antitrust laws.5  They contend that the
result is artificially high costs for brand-name drugs due to the unlawful
restriction of generic competition.6
Initial actions challenging reverse payment settlements proved highly
successful.  In the late 1990s, the FTC brought a series of actions against
branded and generic manufacturers that entered into settlements which included
significant reverse payment settlements.7  These actions resulted in several
consent decrees dissolving the settlements and restricting both the branded and
generic manufacturers from entering into any settlements without FTC
approval.8  The Sixth Circuit followed the lead of the FTC in In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litigation, an action brought by pharmaceutical purchasers
challenging a reverse payment settlement agreement between branded and
generic manufacturers.9  The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision
that the $89.83 million reverse payment settlement between the manufacturers
was “a naked, horizontal restraint of trade and, as such, per se illegal” under the
Sherman Act.10
The per se rule applies to specific trade practices, holding them as illegal
restraints of trade under antitrust laws, “regardless of whether it actually harms
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/4
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11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (8th ed. 2004); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (holding that certain restraints of trade are per se illegal “because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue”); 7 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION § 1509c (2d ed. 2003) (stating that per se illegality applies when the
restraint of trade can “properly [be] classified as ‘naked’”).
12. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006);
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929
(2006); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
13. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc, 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); In
re Ciprofloxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 520; Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 2d 986 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 1360; see also 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 11, § 1507f (stating that the “standard rule of reason methodology [] requires the
plaintiff to allege and define some market in which competition is significantly restrained by
the challenged behavior”).
15. 402 F.3d at 1065-66.
16. Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
17. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition at 11-12, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929
(2006) (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2428345.
anyone.”11  Several recent court decisions, however, rejected this per se illegal
approach to reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.12  In
its place, some courts adopted the rule of reason to evaluate the antitrust aspects
of settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.13  The rule of reason requires the
court to analyze economic factors to determine if the action is an unreasonable
restraint of trade and, thus, an antitrust violation.14  In Schering-Plough Corp.
v. FTC, the Eleventh Circuit rejected both the per se and rule of reason antitrust
analysis and instead adopted its own three-part standard for analyzing antitrust
liability in the patent law arena.15  The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari of
the FTC’s petition in Schering-Plough now leaves this narrow, but important,
area of law without a strong guiding principle.
As is often the case, academic arguments can be found on all sides of the
issue.  Reverse payment proponents point out that “[t]he general policy of the
law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the policy extends to the
settlement of patent infringement suits.”16  The fact that, in litigation, patents are
presumed to be valid is also used by proponents to bolster the argument that
reverse payment settlements are not antitrust violations, as long as the
settlement does not restrict generic entry beyond the patent term.17  Opponents
contend that the willingness of pharmaceutical patent holders to pay millions
of dollars to protect their monopoly indicates that the branded patent is invalid
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
378 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:375
18. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition at 8-12, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543
U.S. 939 (2004) (No. 03-779), 2003 WL 23146428.
19. See, e.g., James C. Burling, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements: The Battle for a
Benchmark, ANTITRUST, Spring 2006, at 41; Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Antitrust Trade
and Practice, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 19, 2005, at 3.  
20. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126
S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2006 WL 1358441.  The Court was presented with another
opportunity to address these issues when In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d
187 (2d Cir. 2006), was appealed, but again, following the recommendation of the Solicitor
General of the United States, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Joblove v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007) (No. 06-830), 2007 WL 1511527, the Court elected to deny
certiorari.  Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007).
21. S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007), H.R. 1432, 110th Cong. (2007), S. 3582, 109th Cong.
(2006).
22. H.R. 1902, 110th Cong. (2007).
or not infringed by the generic competitor and thus, in such cases, the
settlements must be challenged.18 
Ultimate resolution of these issues will have to come from the Supreme
Court, and many court observers anticipated such resolution via Schering-
Plough.19  Unfortunately, as the Solicitor General of the United States stated in
his amicus brief on behalf of the United States opposing the FTC’s petition to
the Court, “[w]hatever the correct standard for determining the antitrust
treatment of patent settlements involving reverse payments, [Schering-Plough
does] not present an appropriate occasion to address that question or to assess
the validity of the FTC’s approach.”20  This comment contends that the
Supreme Court should specifically address the issue of reverse payment
settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers and
hold that reverse payment settlements which exceed a de minimus standard
should be subject to patent examination to ensure the settlement does not
protect an invalid or noninfringed patent and thus further an illegal monopoly.
Further, this comment argues that the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics
Act21 and the Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 200722
banning settlements in the pharmaceutical industry that transfer value from the
patent holder to the generic manufacturer and result in delayed entry of the
generic should not be enacted by Congress as introduced because conditions
might exist in which a reverse payment settlement actually enhances
pharmaceutical competition.
Part II of this comment explains the Hatch-Waxman procedures for generic
entry into the pharmaceutical market and the conflicts that can arise between
patent and antitrust law in the pharmaceutical industry under these unique
conditions.  Part III examines FTC actions against and litigation involving
reverse payment settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/4
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23. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21,
28 & 35 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
24. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000)).
25. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
26. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000) (original version at ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)).
27. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000) (original version at ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952)).
28. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro II), 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
29. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 & 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003)).
manufacturers and the variety of results that have been obtained.  Part IV
explores the scholarly debate surrounding reverse payment settlements in the
pharmaceutical industry.  Finally, part V proposes that the Supreme Court
determine its own standard for analyzing patent settlements specific to the
pharmaceutical industry by rejecting the standard of the Eleventh Circuit.
Instead, the Court should require that reverse payment settlements that exceed
a de minimus standard be found in violation of antitrust principles if unable to
withstand patent examination.  This comment concludes in part VI.
II. How the Hatch-Waxman Act Shifted the Patent-Antitrust Balance in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,23 the
Hatch-Waxman Act, dramatically altered the pharmaceutical industry in the
United States.  Prior to 1984, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act mandated that
generic drug manufacturers submit a new drug application (NDA) to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval to enter the market with full
efficacy and safety studies and data, mirroring the requirements of pioneer
manufacturers.24  Such testing and trials were so expensive that few generics
actually entered the market.25  Section A is an exploration of the statutory
changes to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act26 and the Patent Act27
implemented by the Hatch-Waxman Act as well as the impact of these
amendments on the generic approval process.  Section B examines the issues
that arose between patent and antitrust law as a result of those changes and
explores reverse payment settlements as “a natural by-product of Hatch-
Waxman’s shift of the litigation risk from the generic manufacturer to the
patent holder.”28  Section C discusses the 2003 amendments to the Hatch-
Waxman Act contained in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (Medicare Reform Act)29 and examines their impact
on some of the patent-antitrust issues arising from reverse payment settlements.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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30. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000); see also James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and
Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 448-54 (1986).
32. Wheaton, supra note 31, at 451-54.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
34. Wheaton, supra note 31, at 452.
35. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act)
§ 201(c), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
21, 28 & 35 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).  IND application takes place after animal testing
of the drug has been completed, and approval of the IND is necessary to begin human clinical
trials.  21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1)(A) (2000).
36. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2690.
37. Reid F. Herlihy, Note, The Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act:
Allowing Generics to Induce Infringement, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 119, 133 (2005).
38. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act’s Delicate Balance
The Hatch-Waxman Act “emerged from Congress’ efforts to balance two
conflicting policy objectives: to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms to
make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products,
while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of
those drugs to market.”30  The FDA approval process for new pharmaceuticals
requires extensive animal testing and approval of an investigational new drug
(IND) application prior to any human clinical trials to demonstrate the safety
and efficacy of the new drug.31  This process, including all the clinical trials,
takes place after patent application and significantly impacts the effective term
of the patent.32  The basic term of a patent in the United States is twenty years
from the date of application.33  Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, studies
indicated that “effective patent life [of pharmaceuticals] had fallen to less than
seven years.”34  The Hatch-Waxman Act provided for a unique patent term
extension for pharmaceuticals, calculated based on the amount of time between
the IND application and final FDA approval of the new drug application that
allows up to a maximum patent life of fourteen years.35  This extension of a
patent’s life was drafted to “create incentives for increased research
expenditures” by pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturers.36  With this additional
time, pharmaceutical patents today typically have an eleven to twelve year
effective patent life.37  
In exchange for the patent term extension, pioneer pharmaceutical
manufacturers were forced to accept an expedited generic drug approval
process that resulted in a dramatic increase in generic competition.38  Prior to
the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic manufacturers had to wait until a pioneer
drug’s patent term expired to begin the testing necessary for FDA approval,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/4
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39. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990).  The development time
for generic drugs is typically three to five years.  Sarah M. Yoho, Note, Reformation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act: An Unnecessary Resolution, 27 NOVA L. REV. 527, 549 (2003).
40. Hatch-Waxman Act § 202 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
41. Id. § 101 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (Supp. III 2003)).
Bioequivalence is defined by the statute as the generic drug having no significant difference in
the rate and extent of absorption as the patented drug.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2000).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5).
43. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).  ANDAs containing paragraph I, II, and III certifications of a
novel ingredient patent cannot be accepted by the FDA until five years after patent approval
while ANDAs containing a paragraph IV certification of a novel ingredient patent can not be
accepted by the FDA until four years after patent approval.  Id.  See infra notes 51-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the paragraphs I-IV ANDA certifications.
44. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), 355(j)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
45. DAVID REIFFEN & MICHEL R. WARD, “BRANDED GENERICS” AS A STRATEGY TO LIMIT
CANNIBALIZATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS 7 (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/be/healthcare/
wp/12_Reiffen_BrandedGenericsAsAStrategy.pdf.
46. See id.
which resulted in an effective patent term extension for the pioneer drug.39  The
Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Patent Act by inserting a safe harbor
provision for the experimental use of a patented pharmaceutical “solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .”40  This
allows generic manufacturers to obtain a sample of the patented drug to
experimentally verify that the active ingredients of the generic are chemically
equivalent to the patented drug and that the generic is bioequivalent to the
patented drug, as required by Hatch-Waxman’s new “abbreviated new drug
application” (ANDA) for generics.41  Thus, under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
generic manufacturers can now obtain FDA approval as soon as, or even before,
the pioneer patent expires.42  However, patents for novel active pharmaceutical
ingredients receive additional protection because the FDA may not accept a
generic’s ANDA until four or five years after the novel ingredient’s patent
approval date.43
In addition to the patent safe harbor provision, the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
ANDA procedures do not require manufacturers seeking FDA approval for a
generic drug that is the same as and bioequivalent to an FDA approved drug to
submit the same experimental safety and efficacy data as the NDA.44  For
pharmaceuticals developed during the 1990s, the estimated cost of this safety
and efficacy experimentation for an average NDA was $478 million (in year
2000 dollars).45  Allowing a generic manufacturer to make use of the pioneer
manufacturer’s efficacy and safety data, instead of having to go through the
lengthy and expensive process of experimentally recreating that evidence for
approval by the FDA, is a major incentive to bring generics to the market.46  
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47. Id. at 8.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 607 (2003).
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000).
52. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on
Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 169 (2005).
53. Id.; see also § 355(j)(7)(A)(iii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53 (2004).
54. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(III).  If the applicant certifies that the patent will
expire on a specified date, that is the earliest date possible for the generic application.  Id. §
355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
55. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
Generic manufacturers, however, must still bear the cost of experimentally
demonstrating bioequivalence to the pioneer drug.  In addition, they must also
“show sound manufacturing procedures and that [the] product has sufficient
shelf stability.”47  This requires “a production facility and an approved source
of raw material supply [to] be in place prior to filing an ANDA.”48  While these
costs are significant, the ability to utilize a pioneer drug’s safety and efficacy
data creates an economic environment conducive to generic entry.
Ultimately, the Hatch-Waxman Act led to a significant reduction in the cost
of securing FDA approval for generic drugs.49  This, in part, resulted in the
expansion of the generic market from only nineteen percent of the pre-
amendment pharmaceutical market to over forty-seven percent, and while in
1984 only thirty-six percent of the most frequently prescribed drugs with
expired patents had a generic equivalent, now virtually all of these drugs have
a generic competitor.50
“Paragraph IV” certification under the Hatch-Waxman Act represents
another factor encouraging generic entry.51  The FDA requires that
pharmaceutical manufacturers list patents for approved drugs in the FDA’s
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly
known in the industry as the “Orange Book.”52  All abbreviated new drug
applications must contain a certification with respect to the Orange Book listed
patents.53  ANDA paragraph I through III certifications request approval of
generic versions of pioneer drugs: (I) that did not file patent information in the
Orange Book; (II) whose patents have expired; and (III) whose patents will
expire on the specified approval request date.54  Under paragraph IV, however,
the generic manufacturer must certify that the patent listed for the pioneer drug
in the Orange Book “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use,
or sale of the” generic version of the drug.55  If a generic manufacturer makes
a paragraph IV certification, the manufacturer must provide notice of the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/4
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56. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (Supp. III 2003).
57. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
58. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
59. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Act) § 202, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)
(2000)).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. III 2003).  It is possible for the stay period to
exceed thirty months when the ANDA application has been submitted during the fourth year
after the new drug’s FDA approval.  In this instance, the earliest approval of the challenged
ANDA application is set by the Hatch-Waxman Act at seven and one-half years after the new
drug approval date.  Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).  In addition, the district court has the discretion to
shorten or lengthen the stay period based upon the parties’ actions during litigation.  Id. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
61. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
62. Laura J. Robinson, Analysis of Recent Proposals to Reconfigure Hatch-Waxman, 11
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 47, 78 (2003).
63. Id.
64. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act)
application to the patent holder.56  The notice must include “a detailed statement
of the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is
invalid or will not be infringed.”57  The drug patent holder has forty-five days
after receipt of the notice to file a patent infringement suit against the generic
manufacturer or the generic drug will be eligible for FDA approval.58  
The paragraph IV ANDA patent infringement suit filed by the pioneer
manufacturer is an artificial patent infringement suit created by the Hatch-
Waxman Act since no actual infringement has taken place in submitting the
ANDA.59  Filing the patent infringement suit typically grants the patent holder
an automatic thirty-month stay of generic approval, which prevents the
marketing and sale of the generic drug.60  Under the statute, this thirty-month
stay may be reduced if a district court rules that the patent is invalid or not
infringed, or if an appellate court overrules a district court finding of validity
or infringement during the stay.61  This artificial patent infringement litigation,
exclusive to the pharmaceutical industry, permits a generic manufacturer to
challenge a listed pharmaceutical patent without having to go through the
expense of actually manufacturing and marketing the product.  This encourages
generic manufacturers to challenge pioneer patents by allowing resolution of
patent questions prior to the expenditure of these traditional start-up costs.62
Due to their much lower profit margins compared to branded manufacturers, a
finding of patent infringement could be disastrous to generic manufacturers
once start-up costs have been incurred.63
As a further incentive to challenge listed patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act
also provides a 180-day period of generic market exclusivity for the first
generic manufacturer to file a paragraph IV ANDA for a listed patent.64  This
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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§ 101, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I)
(2000)).
65. Id.
66. Hatch-Waxman Act § 101 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)
(2000)).  As originally enacted, the branded and generic manufacturers could act in concert to
prevent the 180-day exclusivity period from commencing, thus blocking all other generics from
the market because the generics could not receive FDA approval until after the period had run.
67. Colman B. Ragan, Saving the Lives of Drugs: Why Procedural Amendments in Hatch-
Waxman Litigation and Certification of Markman Hearings for Interlocutory Appeal Will Help
Lower Drug Prices, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 411, 413 (2004).
68. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
69. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1751 (2003).
market exclusivity results from the statutory ban on FDA approval of
subsequent abbreviated new drug applications until the 180-day period runs.65
As originally enacted, this 180-day market exclusivity period commenced with
either the first commercial marketing of the generic version of the drug or a
court finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed.66  The 180-day market
exclusivity period provides the generic manufacturer an opportunity to secure
a significant portion of the generic market prior to additional generic entry.  It
“can translate into a significant profit for the generic manufacturer to whom it
is awarded and is the big prize that generic manufacturers fight over.”67
The Hatch-Waxman Act achieved its goal of increased generic entry into the
market.68  Unfortunately, as enacted, the Hatch-Waxman Act not only created
incentives for branded manufacturers to invest in research and development of
new drugs and facilitated generic entries into the pharmaceutical market; it also
created incentives for anticompetitive behavior between branded and generic
manufacturers.  The ability of branded manufacturers to obtain multiple,
successive thirty-month stays of generic entry by manipulating Orange Book
patent listings; the ability of generic manufacturers to obtain, but not invoke, the
180-day market exclusivity period; and the ability to settle litigation without
disclosing the settlement terms can all factor into anticompetitive behaviors by
branded and generic manufacturers. 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act’s Antitrust Implications
The automatic stays of generic entry, artificial infringement actions, and 180-
day market exclusivity period for the paragraph IV first filer created by the
Hatch-Waxman Act raise antitrust and patent issues in the pharmaceutical
industry not typically found elsewhere.69  Two questionable interconnected
courses of behavior followed by branded and generic manufacturers are of
particular interest to the FDA and FTC, courts, legal scholars, and consumers
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when analyzing antitrust concerns in the pharmaceutical industry.70  First,
concern arises from the Orange Book patent listing practices of branded
manufacturers and the subsequent thirty-month stay of generic approval that the
patent holder can obtain against a paragraph IV ANDA filer.  Prior to the 2003
amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent holders could manipulate the
patent listing process to obtain multiple, consecutive thirty-month stays.71
Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act creates the potential for branded and generic
manufacturers to settle patent infringement litigation, often involving reverse
payments, which works to delay generic entry to the market in excess of actual
patent protection were litigation to go forward.72  The ability of the branded
manufacturer to obtain multiple thirty-month stays of generic entry places
significant pressure on the generic manufacturer to settle the litigation and thus
enhances the possibility that the settlement results in expanded patent powers
for the branded manufacturer.
New drug application filers must include patent information for listing in the
Orange Book when patents cover a drug or method of drug use which
reasonably may result in a claim of patent infringement.73  Supplements to the
NDA that alter the strength or formulation, use, or method of administration of
the drug require that the patent information of the NDA be updated as well.74
In addition, if patents claiming the drug or uses of the drug are issued after the
NDA was approved, the holder of the approved application is required to file
that patent information with the FDA within thirty days for subsequent
inclusion in the Orange Book.75  All of these subsequently listed patents
required generic manufacturers to make new ANDA paragraph IV listings.76
“Consequently, one of the major frustrations of generic companies with the
original Hatch-Waxman legislation [was] that it allowed innovative [pioneer]
companies to obtain multiple [thirty]-month stays on FDA approval of generic
drugs.”77
The ability on the part of branded manufacturers to obtain multiple thirty-
month stays results in anticompetitive behavior in the pharmaceutical industry
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unavailable in other industries.78  Such behavior could be implicated under
section 5 of the FTC Act which makes unlawful “[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce . . . .”79  The FDA’s refusal to police such listings,
however, exacerbated manipulation of the Orange Book listing process.80  In
addition, the Federal Circuit held that, prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act being
amended, no private cause of action existed to de-list patents from the Orange
Book; thus, generic manufacturers were powerless to fight the practice of
manipulating the patent listing process to obtain multiple stays.81  The ability
to invoke multiple stays without regulatory oversight also led to branded
manufacturers broadly interpreting which patents needed to be listed and when
they would be listed to maximize their ability to restrict generic entry into the
market.82  These behaviors increased the incentive for generic manufacturers to
settle patent infringement suits with pioneer manufacturers.83  
Anticompetitive settlements between branded and generic manufacturers
have additional antitrust implications.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes
illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . .”84  Section 2 states that
“[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”85  But under
patent law, a patent holder is granted the statutory power to monopolize or
restrain trade: “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
the patent.”86  Thus, the question in analyzing branded-generic settlements
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becomes one of determining when patent protections end and antitrust
principles begin.
A settlement that keeps a generic drug off the market even though the
branded drug has no patent or whose patent expired clearly falls outside of
patent protection and constitute a violation of section 1 or 2 of the Sherman
Act87 or section 5 of the FTC Act.88  In contrast, a settlement involving the
restriction of generic entry when the patent was deemed valid or infringed by
a court clearly falls under patent protection and does not violate antitrust laws.89
Unfortunately, the incentives created by the Hatch-Waxman Act generate a
number of patent infringement settlements involving reverse payments that fall
squarely between these two extremes.90  
The Hatch-Waxman Act’s regulatory scheme allows branded manufacturers
and the paragraph IV first filers to settle patent litigation delaying generic entry
in a manner beneficial to both, but costly to consumers.91  The Act grants the
patent holder an automatic thirty-month stay of generic approval for simply
filing a patent infringement suit against a paragraph IV abbreviated new drug
applicant even if the patent is suspected to be weak, not infringed, or even
improperly listed in the Orange Book.92  As it was originally enacted, the
Hatch-Waxman Act allowed the ANDA paragraph IV first filer to retain the
180-day market exclusivity right even if the patent was upheld and the first
filer’s entry was delayed until patent expiration.  Subsequent noninfringing
generics would be blocked from entering the market until 180 days after patent
expiration.93  And since the FDA was unlikely to penalize an ANDA paragraph
IV first filer that incorrectly asserted the invalidity or noninfringement of the
branded manufacturer’s patent, the ANDA applicant had significant incentive
to file a paragraph IV certification knowing that their legal opinion of invalidity
or noninfringement may be suspect.94  In sum, the pre-amendment Hatch-
Waxman Act created “the perverse incentive for Hatch-Waxman litigants to
agree to anticompetitive deals.”95
Because branded-generic settlements take place under the patent umbrella,
differences of opinion arise as to the proper application of antitrust principles
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to such settlements.96  Per se and the rule of reason represent the two traditional
methods of antitrust analysis for potentially anticompetitive activity.97  Per se
violations develop over time as courts rule that certain anticompetitive
behaviors are so detrimental to consumers that a full-blown analysis of the case
is not required to determine that antitrust laws have been violated.98  Instead, the
violation is presumed and the behavior is considered illegal.99  Under a rule of
reason analysis, anticompetitive behavior is examined to determine if it
significantly restricts competition and represents an unjustified business
practice; actions with both characteristics are typically harmful to consumers
and are, thus, illegal.100  In between the per se and rule of reason approaches is
the “quick look” approach to antitrust analysis.  The quick look approach
“applies to those intermediate cases where the anticompetitive impact of a
restraint is clear from a quick look, as in a per se case, but procompetitive
justifications for it also exist.”101  A quick look approach would be appropriate
if “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question have an anticompetitive effect,” but
the activity did not fall within a defined per se class.102  Much of the friction
among legal commentators, and even among courts, centers on which analysis
should apply to reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry: per
se, rule of reason analysis, quick look, or some other judicially determined
analysis.
The FTC’s initial position was to apply the per se antitrust violation standard
to reverse payment settlements that resulted in delayed generic entry.103  The
FTC began investigating anticompetitive behaviors in the pharmaceutical
industry in the late 1990s and focused on the unique conditions created by the
Hatch-Waxman Act that seemed ripe for anticompetitive abuse.104  One
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behavior examined was the practice of branded manufacturers obtaining
multiple thirty-month stays of generic approval, encouraging settlement of
litigation.105  Also, the practice of the paragraph IV first filer retaining, but not
invoking, the 180-day market exclusivity period presented a concern because
such actions could be part of a branded-generic settlement in order to lock other
generics out of the market.106  The antitrust concerns were furthered by the
secrecy of infringement settlements which precluded a full examination of the
potential anticompetitive behaviors of the settling parties.107  Congress
responded to these concerns and included amendments to the Hatch-Waxman
Act in the massive Medicare Reform Act of 2003.108
C. Amending Hatch-Waxman
Title XI, Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals, of the Medicare Reform Act
of 2003 amended the Hatch-Waxman Act in an effort to address the concerns
that had arisen within the pharmaceutical industry since 1984.109  The
amendments were intended to be a “legislative fix to the Hatch-Waxman
strategic behavior problem” that resulted in anticompetitive behavior by
branded and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.110  Amendments address the
thirty-month stay provision and the 180-day market exclusivity provision.111
Also, new provisions allow for FTC review of some settlements between
pharmaceutical manufacturers.112  Further, the amendments permit an ANDA
paragraph IV filer to seek a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or
noninfringement should the patent holder elect not to file a patent infringement
suit.113  The amendments to the thirty-month stay, the 180-day market
exclusivity provision, and FTC review of settlements closely mirrored the
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recommendations found in Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An
FTC Study.114
The amendments to the thirty-month stay provision mandate that the
infringement action brought by the patent holder against any abbreviated new
drug application paragraph IV filer be based on “information [that] was
submitted . . . before the date on which the application . . . was submitted.”115
As a result, branded manufacturers can no longer obtain multiple thirty-month
stays.116  Only patents listed in the Orange Book at the time of ANDA filing can
be used to trigger the patent infringement suit and the thirty-month stay of
generic approval.117  In addition, the amendments also clarify that a district
court’s finding of patent invalidity or noninfringement ends the thirty-month
stay period.118  Thus, as a result of the amendments, generics no longer have to
wait for a final ruling on the issue if taken up on appeal.119  If the district court
finds the patent valid or infringed, the thirty-month stay period can end on the
date of an appellate decision reversing the district court or on the date the court
enters a consent decree or settlement order.120  Given the nature of patent
litigation, however, it is unlikely that litigation will be completed within the
thirty-month stay period, especially if the decision is taken up on appeal.
Additionally, as a prophylactic measure, ANDA filers are now prohibited from
amending or supplementing the original ANDA by adding a new drug to the
application, thus preventing generic applicants from adding new drugs to a
thirty-month stay that has already commenced.121
The Medicare Reform Act’s amendments also provide for the forfeiture of
the 180-day market exclusivity period granted to the paragraph IV first filer
under certain conditions.122  ANDA first filers forfeit the market exclusivity
period due to: (1) a failure to market the generic within specified time periods;
(2) the withdrawal of the application; (3) the amendment or withdrawal of the
paragraph IV certification; (4) the failure to obtain tentative approval for the
application; (5) entering into a settlement agreement with another generic or
branded manufacturer which has been found by the FTC or a court to violate
antitrust laws in a final decision that has not been or can not be appealed, except
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to the Supreme Court; and (6) the expiration of all patents addressed in the
application.123  Thus, the amendments effectively remove an incentive to enter
into collusive settlements.  The paragraph IV first filer can no longer obtain but
not commence the 180-day market exclusivity period preventing other generics
from obtaining FDA approval for an expansive period of time.124
In addition, the amendments also require that certain agreements entered into
by pharmaceutical companies be filed with the Assistant Attorney General and
the FTC.125  Filing requirements apply to agreements between pioneer and
generic manufacturers that affect the listed brand-name drug in the ANDA, the
generic drug that is the subject of the ANDA, or the 180-day market exclusivity
period that is the subject of that ANDA or any other ANDA for the same listed
brand-name drug.126  In addition, agreements between generic manufacturers
that affect the 180-day market exclusivity period of one of the ANDAs must
also be filed with the Assistant Attorney General and the FTC.127  This filing
requirement will shed much needed light on settlement agreements in the
pharmaceutical industry.128
The amendments added additional language to the Hatch-Waxman Act that
allows a generic manufacturer to seek the delisting of a patent in the Orange
Book or a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or noninfringement.129  This
necessity was brought on by a conflict between the Federal Circuit and the
FDA.  In holding that no independent cause of action existed for generic
manufacturers to delist a patent from the Orange Book, the Federal Circuit
placed the burden of delisting patents on the FDA holding that “an ANDA
applicant can bring a delisting action against the FDA under the Administrative
Procedure Act.”130  Unfortunately, the FDA asserted that it did not have either
the legal expertise or resources to police patent listings in the Orange Book.131
To resolve this dispute, section 1101(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I) of the Medicare Reform Act
provides that an ANDA filer in a patent infringement suit may bring a
counterclaim seeking to correct or delist patent information in the Orange
Book.132  Unfortunately, section 1101(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II) specifically states that no
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other independent cause of action to delist patents is authorized.133  Another
benefit for generics is provided in section 1101(a)(2)(C)(i), however; if a patent
holder does not assert a patent infringement claim against a paragraph IV
ANDA filer, the ANDA filer can seek a declaratory judgment on patent validity
or infringement by the ANDA.134  It is hoped that “these provisions will help
resolve patent disputes and clear the way to the introduction of new generic
drugs by eliminating patents that are deemed by courts to be invalid or not
infringed.”135
It is still too early to determine the impact of the Medicare Reform Act on
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry because the current crop of reverse
payment settlement cases that progressed through the administrative and
judicial systems in the past six years were all commenced prior to the Medicare
Reform Act’s enactment.  It is telling, however, that the seventeen settlements
reported to the FTC in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 involving both a reverse
payment of some kind and delayed generic entry were the first such settlements
involving both characteristics known to the FTC since 1999 when it first began
investigating reverse payment settlements.136  And as the FTC states, “[i]t is
worth noting that [sixteen] of the agreements . . . occurred after the 11th Circuit
Court of Appeals’ decision in Schering-Plough v. Federal Trade Commission,
reversing the Commission’s decision that two settlements involving a restriction
on generic entry and compensation to the generics violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act.”137
III. The Administrative and Judicial Response to Reverse Payment
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry
When the FTC began to investigate reverse payment settlements in the late
1990s, it uncovered eight settlement agreements finalized between 1992 and
1999 that included both a reverse payment to the generic manufacturer and
delayed market entry by the generic drug.138  These settlements provided the
basis for the reverse payment litigation that has made its way through the FTC
and the courts since 1999.
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A. The Settlement Party Ends: The FTC’s Investigation of Reverse Payment
Settlements
1. Abbott Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The FTC’s 1999 announcement that it would investigate reverse payment
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry essentially ended the practice until
the Schering-Plough ruling was handed down in 2005.139  One of the FTC’s
first actions resulted in a consent decree with Abbott Laboratories, the patent
holder, and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, the ANDA paragraph IV first filer.140  The
FTC complaint alleged that the day after Geneva’s generic received FDA
approval, Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month to stay out of
the market until a district court ruled on the patent litigation.  Abbott also
agreed to pay $4.5 million per month into an escrow account on a winner-take-
all basis if Abbott were to lose at the district level and appeal the ruling.141
Geneva agreed to refrain from marketing its generic throughout the appeals
process and to retain control of its 180-day market exclusivity period,
preventing other generics from receiving FDA approval.142
According to the FTC complaint, Geneva refrained from marketing its
generic after winning on a summary judgment motion while Abbott lost in the
Federal Circuit and appealed to the Supreme Court.143  Nevertheless, about a
year and a half after signing the agreement, Abbott and Geneva became aware
of the FTC’s investigation into the reverse payment settlement and voluntarily
ended it.144  While the consent decrees signed by Abbott and Geneva do not
admit guilt in these matters, the terms of the decrees imposed strict limitations
on any future patent infringement settlements for either party.145
2. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Carderm Capital L.P., and Andrx Corp.
Shortly after issuing its complaint against Abbott and Geneva in March of
2000, the FTC issued a complaint against Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Incorporated (Hoechst MRI), Carderm Capital L.P., a limited partnership
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controlled by Hoechst MRI that held the patents at issue, and Andrx
Corporation, the ANDA paragraph IV first filer.146  The complaint alleged that
Hoechst MRI agreed to pay Andrx $10 million per quarter once Andrx received
FDA approval to market its generic.147  The payments were to continue until a
final judgment was rendered in the litigation, Andrx obtained a license from
Hoechst MRI to market a generic, or Hoechst MRI decided to market its own
generic or provide a license to another generic manufacturer.148  Hoechst MRI
also agreed to make an additional payment of $60 million per year for the same
time period should it lose the infringement suit.149  In exchange, the complaint
alleged that Andrx agreed not to market the generic covered by the paragraph
IV ANDA or any other generic versions of the drug.  Further, Andrx would
retain its 180-day market exclusivity period, thus preventing FDA approval of
any other generics.150
Hoechst MRI and Andrx consented to similar terms as Abbott and Geneva,
restricting their ability to participate in patent settlements.151  Unfortunately for
Hoechst MRI and Andrx, this did not conclude the litigation.  Purchasers of
Cardizem CD, Hoechst MRI’s branded drug, later filed an antitrust action
against Hoechst MRI and Andrx in the Eastern District of Michigan which the
Sixth Circuit ultimately heard in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.152  As
discussed in Part III.B.1, infra, the Sixth Circuit held that the settlement
between Hoechst MRI and Andrx was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.153
3. American Home Products
The FTC complaint against Schering-Plough Corporation, Upsher-Smith
Laboratories, and American Home Products Corporation (AHP) also moved
beyond the administrative level and was decided by the Eleventh Circuit in
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC.154  AHP, however, opted not to pursue the
action at the FTC administrative hearing level and instead agreed to a consent
order with the FTC.155  In its complaint against Schering-Plough, Upsher-Smith,
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and AHP, the FTC alleged that Schering-Plough, the branded manufacturer,
made anticompetitive reverse payments to Upsher-Smith and AHP, potential
generic competitors.156
ESI Lederle, Incorporated (ESI), a division of AHP, filed a paragraph IV
ANDA challenging Schering’s patent for its branded medication seeking
approval as soon as Upsher-Smith’s 180-day exclusivity period ran.157  The
FTC alleged that in exchange for delayed market entry of ESI’s generic,
Schering-Plough agreed to pay AHP and ESI up to $15 million.158  In April
2002, two months prior to the FTC’s Administrative Law Judge’s decision in
favor of the manufacturers, AHP agreed to a consent order with the FTC and
withdrew from the litigation.159  The consent decree again placed severe
restrictions on AHP’s ability to settle patent infringement litigation.160
4. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company also agreed to significant restraints on its
ability to settle patent litigation, as well as limitations on its Orange Book
patent listing practices, when it signed a consent decree with the FTC in April
2003.  The FTC’s complaint against Bristol-Myers alleged that it had been
engaging in anticompetitive conduct relating to its highly profitable brand-name
drugs that had cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars.161  Bristol-Myers
agreed to cease manipulating Orange Book listings and filing false patent
information for the purpose of obtaining multiple thirty-month stays.162  Bristol-
Myers also agreed not to enter into reverse payment settlements that required
the generic manufacturer to retain the 180-day market exclusivity period
blocking other generics from the market.163
As evidenced by these consent decrees, the FTC’s position has long been that
reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry that result in
delayed generic entry are anticompetitive and violate antitrust laws.  In its brief
appealing the administrative law judge’s ruling in favor of the defendants in In
re Schering-Plough Corp., the FTC initially articulated its belief that reverse
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payment settlements are per se antitrust violations.164  Nevertheless, in its
opinion reversing the administrative law judge’s decision in favor of the
manufacturers, the FTC relied on a rule of reason analysis in finding the
settlement agreements illegal.165  A careful reading of the FTC’s opinion,
however, seems to indicate that it will apply a presumption of illegality to
reverse payment settlements involving payments greatly exceeding potential
litigation costs which would be so difficult to rebut, as to almost serve as a de
facto per se standard.
B. The Settlement Party Begins Again?  Reverse Payment Settlements Go to
Court
While the FTC consistently opposes reverse payment settlements as
anticompetitive, courts trend toward the opposite conclusion.  Unfortunately,
antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements between branded and
generic manufacturers have not led to consensus on the major issues in
pharmaceutical patent-antitrust litigation.166  The presumptive weight given to
patent validity, the importance of ancillary agreements in which the branded
manufacturer makes significant payments to the generic manufacturer for
licenses to unproven products of questionable value, and the relevance of the
policy favoring settlements all receive a variety of treatments by courts.167  Also
unresolved is “the legality of ‘reverse payments’ that exceed the anticipated
profits of the generic product.”168  Given the current state of case law in this
area, guidance from the Supreme Court is desperately needed.
1. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation
Initially, courts seemed to follow the FTC’s lead, finding reverse payment
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry per se antitrust violations.  The
plaintiffs in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, direct purchasers of
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.’s branded drug, filed suit in the Eastern District
of Michigan alleging that the reverse payment settlement discussed in Part III.A
violated federal and state antitrust laws.169  In granting a partial summary
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interlocutory appeal on its finding that the settlement agreement was a per se
violation of the Sherman Act and its corresponding state laws.170  In making its
ruling on the certified question, the Sixth Circuit focused on both the $10
million per quarter payment from Hoechst MRI to Andrx Pharmaceuticals for
Andrx to refrain from marketing its FDA approved generic and on Andrx’s not
invoking or relinquishing its 180-day market exclusivity period.171
The court determined that the effect of the settlement agreement “was, at its
core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition . . . throughout the entire
United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”172  The
court found that the settlement expanded patent rights for Hoechst MRI,
because Andrx was required to retain the 180-day exclusivity period preventing
any other noninfringing generics from legally entering the market.173  As the
court stated, “it is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally
arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the patent’s
effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only potential competitor
$40 million per year to stay out of the market.”174
2. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida also
found a reverse payment settlement between branded and generic
manufacturers a per se violation of antitrust laws, but the Eleventh Circuit on
appeal held that the per se application was inappropriate because valid patents
permit anticompetitive behaviors.175  The first settlement involved a reverse
payment from Abbott Laboratories to Geneva Pharmaceuticals and restricted
Geneva from marketing its FDA approved generic in exchange for $4.5 million
per month.176  Geneva had actually filed two abbreviated new drug applications,
one for the capsule form and one for tablet form, both containing paragraph IV
certifications that Abbott’s patent was invalid.177  Abbott only filed a patent
infringement suit against the tablet ANDA, thus allowing the capsule version
to receive FDA approval as early as forty-five days after the application date.178
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Abbott was also faced with a paragraph IV ANDA from Zenith Goldline
Pharmaceuticals.179
Zenith filed its ANDA prior to Geneva, but Abbott listed two new patents it
obtained in the Orange Book and asserted that Zenith would have to amend its
ANDA to take the new patents into account.180  Zenith filed a suit to force
Abbott to delist the patents in question and Abbott counterclaimed for
infringement.181  Zenith lost at the district level, and subsequently appealed to
the Federal Circuit.182  Abbott and Zenith then entered into a settlement
agreement whereby both dismissed their causes of action, Zenith acknowledged
the validity of Abbott’s patents, and Zenith agreed not to market a generic
version until another generic entered the market or one specific patent held by
Abbott for the drug expired in two years.183  In exchange, Zenith received, in
essence, a $2 million per month payment until the agreement terminated.184
Although the court found Abbott’s patent invalid just months after the
Geneva and Zenith settlements were reached, both generic manufacturers
continued to honor the deals by refraining to market their generic versions in
exchange for the payments.185  Still, because the parties signed the agreements
prior to the finding of patent invalidity, the Eleventh Circuit “reject[ed] the
district court’s characterization of the instant Agreements as illegal per se.”186
The Eleventh Circuit focused on Geneva and Zenith’s admission that if the
patent were valid, they would have infringed.187  The court stated that “exposing
settling parties to antitrust liability for the exclusionary effects of a settlement
reasonably within the scope of the patent merely because the patent is
subsequently declared invalid would undermine the patent incentives” favoring
settlement over the costs and risks of litigation.188  The court acknowledged that
its position rejecting per se illegality was in conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s
ruling in Cardizem, but found that “[w]hen the exclusionary power of a patent
is implicated, . . . the antitrust analysis cannot ignore the scope of the patent
exclusion.”189  The court then reversed the partial summary judgment for the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/4
2007] COMMENTS 399
190. Id. at 1313. 
191. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1294-1310 (S.D.
Fla. 2005).
192. Id. at 1295-96.
193. Id. at 1319.
194. Id.
195. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Dec. 8,
2003) (final order), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929
(2006).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2000).
197. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
plaintiffs and remanded the case back to the district court for a full antitrust
analysis of the settlements.190
On remand, the district court scrupulously followed the directives of the
circuit court and evaluated the exclusionary scope of the patent to determine if
the settlements were in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.191  The district
court’s three-part test, which took “into account both the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion and Professor Hovenkamp’s analytical approach,” examined the
exclusionary scope of the patent, evaluated the potential outcomes of patent
litigation, and evaluated “whether the settlement represented a reasonable
implementation of the protections afforded by the ‘207 patent, in light of the
applicable law, the then-pending litigation, and the general policy justifications
supporting settlements of intellectual property disputes.”192  The court
ultimately held that the settlement agreement exceeded the scope of the patent
and was not a reasonable implementation of patent protection.193  As such, the
district court again found that the agreement was a per se antitrust violation and
summarily found for the plaintiffs.194
3. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC
The Eleventh Circuit’s rejection of the initial per se finding in Valley Drug
facilitated its hearing the appeal of the FTC’s holding that Schering-Plough
Corporation, Upsher-Smith Laboratories, and American Home Products/ESI
Lederle violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.195  Because
the FTC Act permits corporations to appeal an FTC decision in any circuit
where they do business,196 the Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to apply per se
illegality and its deference to patent validity in Valley Drug made that circuit
a natural choice to appeal the FTC’s reversal of the Administrative Law Judge’s
decision.  The Eleventh Circuit did not disappoint the manufacturers.  In stating
that “[i]t would seem as though the Commission clearly made its decision
before it considered any contrary conclusion,” the court blasted the FTC’s rule
of reason analysis and finding of antitrust violations.197
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The Eleventh Circuit then reemphasized its Valley Drug holding, further
stating that “neither the rule of reason nor the per se analysis is appropriate in
this context.”198  The court then delineated its three-part test for analyzing
antitrust liability when a patent is involved, stating “we think the proper
analysis . . . requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary
potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that
scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”199  The court then applied
its own test to the settlements between Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith and
Schering-Plough and ESI Lederle.200
The Schering-Upsher settlement agreement called for a $60 million payment
for “initial royalty fees” and an additional $10 million in “milestone royalty
payments” to Upsher-Smith in exchange for a delay in the marketing of
Upsher’s generic, as well as Upsher granting Schering-Plough licenses for five
of Upsher’s products.201  The initial Schering-ESI settlement agreement called
for an initial $5 million payment to ESI Lederle, which would increase to $10
million if ESI’s generic received FDA approval.  In exchange, ESI’s generic
could not enter the market for seven years, but its entry would still occur almost
three years prior to patent expiration.202  The final settlement agreement called
for a $5 million payment for “legal fees,” a $10 million payment contingent on
FDA approval of ESI’s generic, and an additional $15 million payment for
licenses for two of ESI’s products.203
In applying its own test, the Eleventh Circuit found these settlements did not
exceed the scope of Schering-Plough’s patent and, thus, were not illegal.204  The
court stated,
that the size of the payment, or the mere presence of a payment,
should not dictate the availability of a settlement remedy.  Due to
the “asymmetrics of risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a potential infringer
a substantial sum in settlement.”205
In its analysis of the settlement agreements, the court gave great weight to the
presumption that all patents are considered valid and that a large payment from
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a patent holder to a potential infringer involving delayed market entry is not an
indication of patent weakness.206  The court also accepted statements by the
parties and their experts that the license fees and royalty payments were
legitimate business transactions unrelated to the delayed entry of the generic
products, finding no evidence to the contrary.207  A somewhat stunning reversal,
given that, based on the same evidence, the FTC found that “the Upsher
licenses were worth nothing to Schering” and the $60 million reverse payment
was simply for the delayed generic entry.208  The court further noted the
exchange of value in settling patent infringement suits was endorsed by the
Supreme Court and reverse payment settlements flow naturally from the Hatch-
Waxman Act.209  According to the court, a ban on reverse payment settlements
would actually reduce the incentives for paragraph IV abbreviated new drug
applications challenging patents because it would limit the options available for
settling any infringement suit that could follow.210
The Eleventh Circuit ruling in Schering-Plough thus provided a blueprint for
the development of reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry
able to withstand an antitrust challenge within that jurisdiction.211  The
settlement may involve large payments as long as the patent can presumptively
be found valid, the generic is allowed entry to the market at some point prior to
the patent expiring, and the payments are ostensibly provided for licenses and
royalties for generic products.  A settlement in which the patent holder knew of
its patent invalidity or the license payments were clearly sham payments would
still presumably be antitrust violations in the Eleventh Circuit.
4. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation
In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,212 the Second Circuit held
that reverse payment settlements that do not exceed the exclusionary scope of
the patent are presumptively lawful, mirroring the Eleventh Circuit’s holding
in Schering-Plough.  The Tamoxifen litigation was brought by consumers, third-
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party medical beneficiary providers, and consumer advocacy groups
challenging a 1993 settlement between patent-holders Zeneca, Inc.,
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, and AstraZeneca PLC (collectively Zeneca) and
generic manufacturer Barr Laboratories, Inc.213  Zeneca held the patent for
Tamoxifen, the most widely prescribed treatment for breast cancer, which was
obtained by Zeneca’s predecessor in August 1985.214  Barr filed an abbreviated
new drug application four months after the patent issued and later amended its
ANDA to a paragraph IV certification.215  Zeneca filed a timely infringement
suit against Barr and its raw material provider, but lost when the patent was
declared invalid in April 1992.216
Zeneca appealed, but while the appeal was pending, Zeneca and Barr entered
into a confidential settlement agreement settling the infringement action and
restoring Zeneca’s patent.  Barr received $21 million and a license to market
Zeneca’s Tamoxifen under the Barr label.217  In exchange, Barr changed its
ANDA certification from paragraph IV to paragraph III, thus preventing Barr
from marketing its own generic until the patent expired in 2002.218  Barr
reserved the right to alter its certification back to paragraph IV if any
subsequent final and unappealable infringement litigation declared the patent
unenforceable or invalid.219  Zeneca also paid Barr’s supplier $9.5 million at the
time of the settlement “and an additional $35.9 million over the following ten
years.”220
The individual consumer, third-party beneficiary provider, and consumer
advocacy group actions challenging the 1993 settlement agreement were
consolidated into a class action suit in the Eastern District of New York.221  The
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in a ruling emphasizing
the patent exceptions to antitrust principles.222  In an opinion that borrowed
heavily from the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in Valley Drug and Schering-
Plough, the majority decision of the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the charges.223  The court stated that settlements are favored in
patent litigation and reverse payments are to be expected in Hatch-Waxman
litigation due to the incentives built into the Hatch-Waxman Act; as such, a per
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se bar to reverse payments would be inappropriate.224  The majority’s holding
exceeds that of the Eleventh Circuit, in stating that no antitrust violation is
possible in a patent reverse payment settlement unless the patent has been
obtained by fraud or the patent enforcement action is “objectively baseless.”225
The majority additionally found that while payments exceeding the generic’s
expected profits may be suspicious, they are not illegal.226  In short, as long as
a settlement does not exceed the presumptively valid patent’s scope, it will not
violate antitrust laws.227
The Second Circuit adopted and expanded the Eleventh Circuit’s logic from
Valley Drug and Schering-Plough and focused the antitrust analysis of reverse
payment settlements on the exclusionary ability of patents and the
anticompetitive effects of expanded patent power.  A settlement that allows
generic entry prior to patent expiration is presumptively valid, regardless of
patent strength, absent knowledge of patent invalidity or clearly sham
settlement payments.  According to the Second and Eleventh Circuits, neither
the direction nor the magnitude of the payment should generally factor into the
analysis, as long as the settlement does not exceed the exclusionary scope of the
patent.  The presumption of patent validity, even in the face of tens or hundreds
of millions of dollars given in payment to protect the patent through a reverse
payment settlement, is highly respected in both the Second and Eleventh
Circuits.
One important factor differentiates the settlements in Schering-Plough and
In re Tamoxifen from the Sixth Circuit’s per se holding in In re Cardizem: the
generic manufacturer in In re Cardizem retained and did not invoke the 180-day
market exclusivity period and, thus, blocked other generics from obtaining FDA
approval, something that could not be done under the current regulatory
scheme.228  In Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen, none of the generic
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manufacturers were held to such terms.  Other generics were free to challenge
Schering-Plough and Zeneca’s patents and possibly receive FDA approval prior
to patent expiration.  Ultimately, the differences between the Sixth Circuit and
the Eleventh and Second Circuits might not be as great as they first appear.
The Third and Ninth Circuits may potentially weigh in on the issue of
reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry as well.  Both
plaintiffs and defendants appealed the jury’s verdict for the defendants in
Kaiser Foundation v. Abbott Laboratories to the Ninth Circuit, involving the
settlement the Eleventh Circuit ruled on in Valley Drug.229  Likewise, the Third
Circuit may have a chance to rule on the same settlement the Eleventh Circuit
ruled on in Schering-Plough.230  Given the amount of litigation working its way
through the court system,231 the public policy implications of reverse payment
settlements, and the variation in judicial response to antitrust actions against
reverse payment settlements, guidance from the Supreme Court is required.
IV. Academic Commentary on Reverse Payment Settlements
When the Supreme Court does take up a reverse payment settlement case, it
will find several distinct academic approaches to the antitrust and patent issues
raised by reverse payment settlement agreements.  One common argument is
that reverse payment settlements should be presumptively illegal, or otherwise
deemed illegal per se if the payment exceeds potential litigation costs.  In direct
opposition to this are the arguments in favor any patent settlement, including
those involving large reverse payments, almost to the point of a presumption of
legality.  A middle ground is forged by various rule of reason analyses that may
or may not treat such settlements as presumptively illegal, but still argue that,
under certain conditions, payments vastly in excess of litigation costs could
ultimately be legal.
A. Reverse Payment Settlements as Presumptively Illegal
The argument that large reverse payment settlements should be considered
presumptively illegal is usually based on two distinct points: “(1) the size of the
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[reverse] payment and (2) the impact of the [reverse] payment on third party
entry prospects.”232  It is argued that as the magnitude of the payment increases,
the more likely it is that the patent holder is protecting a weak or noninfringed
patent, and the settlement violates antitrust principles.233  Noted antitrust scholar
Herbert Hovenkamp contends that when payments greatly exceed potential
litigation costs,
the infringement plaintiff must have significant doubts about the
validity of its patent or the defendant’s status as an infringer.  Thus,
a larger payment suggests a more socially costly outcome —
namely, preserving the exclusion power of the patent, at least vis-a-
vis this particular defendant, even though the patent is likely to be
invalid.  The result is to deny the public the benefits of competition
that it could otherwise obtain.234
The social costs, also referred to as consumer harm, is the difference between
what consumers would gain if the patent litigation were seen through to
completion and what consumers actually receive as a result of the patent
settlement.  These social costs factor heavily in arguments favoring
presumptive liability or per se illegality for reverse payment settlements.235
For example, social costs rise significantly when third party generics not
involved in the settlement agreement are kept from entering the market.236
Settlements entered into prior to the amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act in
2003 raise particular concerns about third party entry prospects since the
paragraph IV first filer is able to retain, but not invoke the 180-day market
exclusivity period.  This ability to prevent further generic approval was a
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
406 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:375
237. See supra Part III.B.1.
238. Hemphill, supra note 229, at 1586 (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc.,
289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003)) (bracketed alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
239. See supra Part II.C.
240. Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 69, at 1759.
241. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per
Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 532-38 (2002).
242. Id.; see also Brodley & O’Rourke, supra note 105, at 55. 
significant factor in the Sixth Circuit’s finding of per se illegality in In re
Cardizem.237
Nevertheless, C. Scott Hemphill makes a persuasive argument that this is not
the only manner in which generics may be kept out of the market.  Because
only the paragraph IV first filer is eligible for the 180-day market exclusivity
period,
[g]eneric firms other than the first filer will lag behind in the
approval process, if they have bothered to file at all; they will also
be less motivated to initiate or vigorously pursue a challenge.  The
subsequent filers’ return on a challenge, aside from being smaller,
depends upon the outcome of the first filer’s suit (and possible
settlement) . . . .  It is therefore inaccurate to assert, as some cases
have, that “[i]n a reverse-payment case, the settlement leaves the
competitive situation unchanged from before the defendant tried to
enter the market.”  The settlement does secure an important change
in the competitive situation; it removes from consideration the most
motivated challenger, and the one closest to introducing
competition.238
While the 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act can cause the paragraph
IV first filer to forfeit the 180-day market exclusivity period, they do not then
make the market exclusivity period available to subsequent paragraph IV
filers.239  Therefore, no subsequent paragraph IV filer will have the same
competitive motivation to undertake a patent challenge.
Because presumptive liability proponents see large reverse payments as a
sign of patent vulnerability and delayed generic entry as socially costly, a
common proposal is to shift “the burden of proof to the infringement
plaintiff.”240  A quick look antitrust approach would be appropriate for such a
proceeding.241  The infringement plaintiff/antitrust defendant would show that,
at the time of the settlement, they would likely prevail had the lawsuit
progressed and that the payment is not excessive.242  Generally, liability
proponents see payments greater than expected litigation and collateral
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expenses as excessive, resulting in a per se antitrust violation.243  This enhances
the benefit of the presumptive liability position in further saving judicial
resources, though not as much as outright per se liability would.  The drawback
of the presumptive liability position is that it might deter parties from entering
into valid settlements involving reverse payments and therefore result in
unnecessary patent litigation.
B. The Legislative Per Se Solution
This drawback is magnified by the legislative response to the Supreme
Court’s refusal to hear Schering-Plough.244  Disregarding any potential benefits
of reverse payment settlements, legislators introduced the Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act to the Senate the day after the Court denied
certiorari.245  The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, and the more
recent Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2007,  would make
any settlement a per se violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act if the settlement provided “anything of value” to an ANDA filer and the
ANDA filer agrees to delay marketing its generic.246  This is a clear return to the
standard the FTC imposed when it first began investigating pharmaceutical
reverse payment settlements, and only reluctantly moderated in its Schering-
Plough arguments.247  Significant difficulties could arise under these acts,
however.  Most notably, what constitutes receiving “anything of value” and
what would be considered delayed marketing.
As several commentators point out, settlements that involve splitting the
remaining patent term into a period of branded exclusivity followed by entry of
the ANDA filer potentially transfers significant value to the generic in the form
of earlier entry to the market.248  While the entry of the generic occurs prior to
patent expiration, it is “delayed” with respect to the potential entry date at the
lapse of the thirty-month stay period or the completion of litigation.  It is
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possible that the acts, if enacted as currently proposed, could essentially bar all
settlements of patent litigation between branded and generic manufacturers.249
While such a stringent per se standard decreases administrative costs and
increases efficiency if the parties settle, ultimately it results in an increase in
complex patent litigation.  And by severely restricting the settlement option, the
Acts could lead to fewer generic challenges of pharmaceutical patents.250
Further, it would unduly restrict the parties’ ability to act in accordance with
their own unique perceptions of several significant factors within the patent
litigation, including: the risks involved and the willingness to accept those risks,
the probabilities of litigation success or failure, knowledge of potential future
competitor drugs in the market, and the individual financial status of each
participant.251
C. The Argument in Favor of Settlements; Presumptive Legality
Strong proponents of patent settlements, including settlements that include
reverse payments, emphasize these individualized concerns in arguing in favor
of presumptive legality for patent settlements.252  Presumptive legality also
increases efficiency and reduces administrative costs by placing a great
emphasis on the presumption of patent validity, much as the Eleventh and
Second Circuits did in Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen.253  One proposed
standard borrows directly from Judge Posner’s opinion in Asahi Glass v.
Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc.254 that both circuit court opinions cited.  The
standard finds “a settlement . . . legitimate ‘unless a neutral observer would
reasonably think either that the patent was almost certain to be declared invalid,
or the defendants were almost certain to be found not to have infringed it, if the
suit went to judgment.’”255 In essence, a “reverse” quick look analysis.
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Another common denominator of both courts and commentators who favor
patent settlements is a strong, traditional rule of reason application and
recognition of the Intellectual Property Guidelines of the Department of Justice
and the FTC.256  Prominent antitrust and trade regulation litigator and former
Assistant Director for the Bureau of Competition at the FTC, Marc G.
Schildkraut,257 enhances this analysis by proposing a two-tiered analysis to
circumvent anticonsumer results that can flow from the application of the
traditional burdens of proof to both the patent and antitrust aspects of the
settlement.258  The traditional burdens of proof are used to determine the merits
of the patent.259  If the antitrust plaintiff
shows that the alleged [patent] infringer would have prevailed and
also establishes the other things necessary to make an antitrust
violation . . . , it establishes a prima facie case against the settling
parties.  The burden then shifts to the [antitrust] defendant to show
that the efficiency effects of the settlement outweigh the
anticompetitive effects.260
In order to show that the infringer would prevail in the patent suit, the antitrust
plaintiff must overcome the presumption of patent validity.  If this were
accomplished, a separate standard, such as his “uncertain competition
methodology” is used to evaluate the antitrust aspects of the settlement to
determine if there is a net social benefit or loss.261  Unfortunately, as Schildkraut
acknowledges, his proposed two-tiered analysis is “quite complex and suffers
from several deficiencies.”262  Therefore, he notes it may be preferable to simply
adopt the “rule of virtual per se legality” of the Eleventh Circuit and Judge
Posner’s decision in Asahi Glass.263
Schildkraut also makes the argument that many patent settlements, not just
those taking place under the Hatch-Waxman Act, include reverse payments.264
The Hatch-Waxman settlements tend to receive much more attention simply
because they involve large monetary payments.  Schildkraut believes that
conventional patent settlements may involve “implicit [reverse] payments that
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reduce the expected damages award” had the litigation continued.265  Therefore,
“[i]f reverse payments are to be condemned without more, we may have no
patent settlements at all.”266  In Schilldkraut’s opinion, given the difficulty of
analyzing the antitrust aspects of patent settlements, “there is something to be
said for simply declaring settlements arguably within the scope of the patent to
be per se legal.”267  This, of course, is exactly the position of the Second and
Eleventh Circuits, which the Supreme Court refused to review when it rejected
certiorari of Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen.  This approach has the
benefit of only requiring a quick look at the settlement to determine if the patent
rights have been expanded or not.  Unfortunately, a significant drawback is that
antitrust principles are accorded a corresponding diminished role in the
presumptive legality approach.
D. The Middle Ground Between Presumptive/Per se Illegality and
Presumptive Legality
A rule of reason antitrust analysis, or some variation on a rule of reason
analysis between the quick look approach and the traditional rule of reason
analysis combined with the presumption of patent validity, occupies the middle
ground between this presumptive legality standard of the Second and Eleventh
Circuits and the presumptive or per se illegality standard.  In an attempt to
minimize the over and under inclusive effects of these two extremes, many
commentators attempt to devise strategies to maximize antitrust principles
without unduly infringing on patent principles.  This position is best voiced by
Thomas F. Cotter, who writes: “[f]or antitrust law to undermine the value of
valid and infringed patents, which a rule discouraging reverse payments would
in some instances do, is troubling.”268  Primarily, this middle ground differs from
the presumptive liability position in that reverse payments in excess of litigation
and collateral expenses are not treated as per se illegal.269  Middle ground
proponents distinguish themselves from presumptive legality proponents in that
middle ground proponents argue that as the size of the reverse payment
increases, the likelihood that the settlement is anticompetitive increases.270
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Differences appear within the middle ground as to where the burden of proof
would lie however.  Cotter holds to the presumptive illegality principle that
shifts the burden of proof to the patent plaintiff/antitrust defendant.271  However,
he is more concerned than Hovenkamp and other presumptive liability
proponents that limiting reverse payment settlements to litigation costs could
“materially affect patent owners’ ex ante incentives by reducing the expected
payoff from invention.”272
Daniel A. Crane places even greater emphasis on the patent owners’ rights
and opposes the presumptive illegality of reverse payment settlements.273  As
Crane writes,
[s]ound public policy must begin with a recognition of the
substantial social costs on both sides of the equation — both to
permitting and to prohibiting exit payments. . . . 
. . . [T]he chief indicator of these competing costs is the merit of
the patentee’s infringement claim.  Exit payments should therefore
be permitted when the patentee’s claims appear ex ante to have
substantial merit and disallowed when they are likely to fail.274
Crane also agrees with presumptive legality proponents and argues that the
burdens of proof should remain with the patent defendant/antitrust plaintiff.275
The middle ground position attempts to limit the over and under inclusiveness
that is inherent in both the presumptive illegality and presumptive legality
positions by requiring a more stringent analysis of the settlement and the patent
and antitrust principles involved.  To achieve this, however, they would incur
greater administrative costs and decreased efficiency due to the requirement for
a more thorough investigation of the settlement agreement and the underlying
patent infringement claim.276
V. A Call for Supreme Court Guidance
A per se illegal standard avoids these administrative costs, but does not
respect patent rights enough, provides too much strength to antitrust principles,
and disallows pharmaceutical patent settlements that are potentially beneficial
to consumers.  In contrast, the presumptive legality standard set by the Second
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and Eleventh Circuits, while also minimizing administrative costs and increasing
efficiency, provides too much deference to the presumption of patent validity,
gives too little respect to antitrust principles, and allows for pharmaceutical
patent settlements that are potentially very harmful to consumers.  While these
shortcuts in the patent-antitrust analysis have the benefit of increasing efficiency
and reducing costs, all shortcuts result in over or under inclusiveness and
potential harm to consumers.  It is time for the Supreme Court to take up a
pharmaceutical reverse payment settlement case and provide clear guidance to
the lower courts and the industry as to where the line should be drawn.  While
balancing the policy choices involved in maximizing efficiency and minimizing
costs, the Court will need to develop an analysis geared to unique patent,
antitrust, and regulatory strictures of the pharmaceutical industry.
The per se illegal standard is ill-adapted for application to reverse payment
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry because it “give[s] almost no weight
to the patent holder’s right to exclude . . . .”277  Given the enormous costs of
developing new drugs, patent rights play a vital role in pharmaceutical
innovation.278  A particularly risk adverse pharmaceutical patent holder who
predicts a probability of prevailing in litigation at eighty percent may be willing
to enter into a reverse payment settlement for expected litigation expenses to
protect the patent rights.  If the settlement also splits the remaining patent term
and allows generic entry to the market a year or two prior to patent expiration,
the generic manufacturer may also see this as a very favorable outcome.  Even
if the generic manufacturer predicts its own probability of success in litigation
at forty percent, twice the expectation of the patent holder, it may favor the
settlement given its own risk aversion tendencies.  Even by the generic
manufacturer’s more optimistic litigation expectation, it would still face a sixty
percent chance of losing the infringement action and be barred from entry until
patent expiration.  In addition, a cash-starved generic manufacturer may be
willing to accept the reverse payment settlement alone, without the patent-
splitting term.  Applying a per se antitrust standard to all reverse payment
settlements negates the ability of the both branded and generic manufacturers to
protect their rights and interests as they best see fit.
In addition, the Supreme Court is increasingly unwilling to expand the
number of per se antitrust applications.279  In Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. the Court states: “Per se rules may decrease administrative
costs, but that is only part of the equation.  Those rules can be counterproductive.
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They can increase the total cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting
procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage.”280  And in Texaco
Inc. v. Dagher the Court stated that “[p]er se liability is reserved for only those
agreements that are ‘so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality.’”281  Given that the Hatch-
Waxman Act creates a unique regulatory scheme for the pharmaceutical
industry, virtually all analyses of branded-generic patent settlements requires an
elaborate study of the industry specific issues involved.  In addition, the Dagher
Court goes on to state that when the economic impact of the actions of the
parties is not immediately obvious, the Court is reluctant to adopt a per se
standard.282  This is an extension of the Court’s principle that “a new per se rule
is not justified until the judiciary obtains considerable rule-of-reason experience
with the particular type of restraint challenged.”283  Because of the small number
and disparate nature of circuit decisions in reverse payment settlement cases, it
is doubtful that the Court would find enough judicial experience in the area to
adopt a per se standard.
The presumptive legality standard, in essence a per se legality, should be
rejected by the Court for the same reasons.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Schering-Plough highlights the consequences of courts taking short-cuts in
patent-antitrust analysis when they do not have a strong judicial history to rely
on.  In Schering-Plough, the court stated that “we find that the agreements fell
well within the protections of the ‘743 patent, and were therefore not illegal.”284
The court based this decision on the fact that the generics were granted market
entry prior to patent term expiration.285  But the settlement agreement covered
more than just the generics for which the manufacturers submitted abbreviated
new drug applications.  Upsher-Smith agreed not only to delay the entry of the
generic in question, but also agreed not to enter the market with any other
similar new generic versions as well, even if the additional generic versions
would not infringe Schering-Plough’s patent.286  It is beyond the exclusionary
scope of Schering-Plough’s patent to block future noninfringing generics,287 yet
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they gained that power through the settlement.  By taking a quick look at the
dates of generic entry and ignoring other factors of the settlement, the Eleventh
Circuit deemed the agreement within the patent’s power.
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach paid too little heed to the application of
antitrust principles to reverse payment settlements within the industry.  As a
result, this approach permits undue consumer harm by allowing patent holders
to expand the scope of their patents and prevent lawful generic entry.  An
artificial monopoly results through decreased generic competition; exactly what
concerned the FTC when they began investigating reverse payment settlements
in the 1990s.
The FTC investigation ended the practice of delayed generic entry and
reverse payments until the Eleventh Circuit’s Schering-Plough decision in
2005.288  However, in fiscal year 2006 (which ran from October 1, 2005 to
September 30, 2006), forty-five settlement agreements were filed with the FTC
under the Medicare Reform Act’s reporting requirements, more than double the
number filed in each of the previous two years.289  Thirty-six of these settlements
were between branded and generic manufacturers.290  Of the thirty-six branded-
generic settlements, twenty-eight were final settlements of active patent
litigation, and of those, twenty involved a restriction on generic entry to the
market.291  Fourteen of twenty settlements that restricted generic entry also
included some form of reverse payment to the generic manufacturer.292
Schering-Plough reopened the reverse payment settlement floodgates by giving
the settling parties a script to follow that emphasizes the exclusionary power of
the patent, whether such power truly exists or not.  Unfortunately, the Eleventh
Circuit’s Schering-Plough analysis focuses on general patent and antitrust issues
and does not pay adequate attention to the unique regulatory scheme that exists
under the Hatch-Waxman Act and how that scheme alters the patent-antitrust
landscape in the pharmaceutical industry.
While considerable commentary exists about the general patent and antitrust
conditions created by the Hatch-Waxman Act in the pharmaceutical industry,293
little has been written about how this regulatory scheme alters the patent and
antitrust playing field.294  Generic discussions of patent and antitrust principles
have much less probative value when focusing specifically within the
pharmaceutical industry.  Several aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act require
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/4
2007] COMMENTS 415
295. Id. at 1583-92, 1612-16.
296. Id. at 1615.
297. See supra Part II.A.
298. Hemphill, supra note 229, at 1603.
299. Id. at 1583.
300. Id. at 1586.
301. Id. at 1590.
particular attention in any discussion of the patent and antitrust aspects of
reverse payment settlements in the industry: the artificial nature of the patent
infringement action in Hatch-Waxman litigation, the 180-day market exclusivity
period gained by the paragraph IV first filer, and the legislative incentives to
litigated challenges of patents within the industry.295
Hatch-Waxman Act patent infringement suits differ markedly from typical
patent infringement suits.  The Hatch-Waxman Act is designed to insure that the
potentially infringing generic manufacturer has full knowledge of any patents
that may be relevant and the manufacturer deliberately opts to undertake the
patent challenge.296  By submitting the paragraph IV abbreviated new drug
application, the generic manufacturer must provide notice to the patent holder
and include a legal opinion as to why they will not infringe the patent or why the
patent is invalid.297  Additionally, in a traditional patent infringement action, if
the infringer were to prevail in litigation and the patent were declared invalid, all
potential competitors would have immediate access to the market.  Such a
scenario enhances the likelihood of settlement in traditional infringement suits
due to the potential for increased competition the defendant would face if they
should prevail.298  The Hatch-Waxman mitigates this settlement incentive by
providing the 180-day market exclusivity period for the ANDA paragraph IV
first filer.
However, since only the paragraph IV first filer is awarded the 180-day
market exclusivity period under the Hatch-Waxman Act, only the first filer has
maximum incentive to challenge the branded manufacturer’s patent.299  A
settlement between the branded manufacturer and the paragraph IV first filer
effectively removes the most viable patent challenger.300  Such a settlement
would tend to negate the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman’s market exclusivity
provision.  The market exclusivity period provides enormous benefits to the first
filer, not only in the form of profits gained during the market exclusivity period,
but also from the ability to establish a market presence and capture a significant
market share.  A settlement between a branded manufacturer and a paragraph IV
first filer that allows the first filer to retain and utilize the market exclusivity
period actually provides the generic manufacture with considerable additional
value,301 without the corresponding consumer benefit.  As Hemphill notes, “[t]he
[branded manufacturer] will accept a settlement only if the entry date is set late
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enough to compensate the innovator for the value thereby transferred to the
generic firm.  On average, that date leaves consumers with less benefit than they
would receive through litigation.”302  Such patent-splitting settlements could
have similar adverse effects for consumers as settlements involving large cash
reverse payments,303 although this potential seems markedly reduced with a pure
patent-splitting settlement.
However, if the settlement also includes a reverse payment to the generic for
further delay in generic entry, consumers suffer even greater harm.  Further, by
providing significant incentives to the paragraph IV first filers, one of the goals
of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to increase consumer access to low cost generics
through drug patent litigation, not through patent settlements.304  “[T]he
promotion and delay of litigation are central preoccupations of the regulatory
regime” of the Hatch-Waxman Act.305  The ease of settling pharmaceutical
patent infringement claims through reverse payments seems contradictory to the
purpose behind the Hatch-Waxman Act’s market exclusivity period.  Just
because “[r]everse payments are a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman
process,”306 that does not mean they should gain presumptive legality status.307
As Hemphill notes, “[n]o doubt many government actions . . . make price-fixing
easier.  But such an action provides no necessary protective coloration to
oligopolists who subsequently choose to collude.”308
Nevertheless, because settlements do play a significant role in patent
litigation, a strict per se antitrust liability standard would have too chilling an
effect on the ability of the settling parties to act in their own self interest without
causing undue harm to consumers.  As Cotter, Crane, Hemphill, and Schildkraut
all point out, conditions exist in which a branded-generic reverse payment
settlement could be beneficial to consumers.309  Each company’s risk aversion,
calculations of the probabilities of litigation outcome, knowledge of other
potential drugs that could be introduced to the market to compete, and financial
standing all could come into play as settlement talks progress.  However, due to
the potential for anticompetitive behavior between branded and generic
manufacturers, the presumptive legality standard espoused by the Eleventh and
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Second Circuits should also be rejected.  The ability of branded manufacturers
to settle infringement actions through massive reverse payments to protect a
noninfringed or invalid patent requires a more thorough analysis of patent
strength.  The unique regulatory nature of the Hatch-Waxman Act creates
conditions that do not lend themselves to such a simplified analysis.
Rather, the Supreme Court should adopt a standard that places the burden of
proof on the pharmaceutical patent settling parties to show that the settlement
agreement is within the scope of the exclusionary power of the patent and that
the settlement does not unduly harm consumers.  A settlement shown to place
consumers in a position similar to what would have resulted from the patent
litigation should withstand an antitrust challenge.  This requires an inquiry into
patent strengths and weaknesses and the validity of the generic manufacturer’s
challenge, and any statement by the settling parties as to the patent’s validity
should not be accorded undue deference, given the potential for the parties to be
protecting an anticompetitive settlement.  Attention should also be given to the
effects of the settlement on the entry of competing generics to adequately assess
consumer harm.
In addition, ancillary patent licensing agreements from the generic
manufacturer to the branded manufacturer as part of a reverse payment
settlement, as in Schering-Plough, should be subject to careful examination by
the court.  Payments that vastly exceed the value of the license should indicate
anticompetitive behaviors.  Further, the Court should hold that reverse payment
settlements exceeding a de minimus standard, possibly twice that of potential
litigation costs to account for collateral expenses, should be subject to a full
patent examination in order to withstand antitrust liability and show that the
settlement is not protecting an invalid or noninfringed patent.
These recommendations are true to an original intent of the Hatch-Waxman
Act; facilitating generic entry through challenges to invalid or noninfringed
patents.  Further, they still allow patent-splitting settlement agreements with
small to moderate reverse payments in which value is also conferred to the
generic through early entry and the benefits of the 180-day market exclusivity
period that do not result in undue consumer harm.  Branded-generic settlements
involving reverse payments close to expected litigation expenses should remain
a viable settlement alternative in pharmaceutical patent litigation.  To foreclose
such settlement opportunities could result in fewer paragraph IV challenges to
patents which ultimately could result in greater consumer harm.  In addition, the
lack of this settlement option might force the parties agreeable to settlement into
the unpredictable world that is patent litigation.  Also, since such settlements
would be banned by the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act and
Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2007, these acts should
not be enacted.  The benefits of ease of administration and theoretical reduction
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of the administrative costs come at too high a price to the participants in high-
stakes pharmaceutical patent litigation cases.
It is true that these recommendations waste some of the benefits of settling the
patent litigation and run contrary to the general patent principles favoring
settlement, but general patent principles are much less persuasive in the
pharmaceutical industry given the unique regulatory scheme created by the
Hatch-Waxman Act.  It is likely that if the Supreme Court were to adopt such a
standard, the number of large reverse payment settlements would decline
dramatically as parties opt to proceed with the patent litigation or settle the
matter by splitting the patent term and allowing generic entry at an earlier date.
However, due to differences in the risk aversion tendencies and expectations of
probable success in litigation by each party, a few moderately large reverse
payment settlements could still emerge from the industry.
VI. Conclusion
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for a unique regulatory scheme in which
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are provided significant incentives to
challenge the patents of branded manufacturers.  Because of these unique
conditions, the potential for anticompetitive behavior between branded and
generic manufacturers is greater than that found in more traditional industries.
The enormous costs and profits absorbed by the pharmaceutical industry further
this potential for anticompetitive behavior.  Because of this risk of
anticompetitive behavior, the Supreme Court needs to grant certiorari to a
pharmaceutical reverse payment settlement case and provide guidance to lower
courts and the industry on what would be acceptable settlement behaviors.  The
Supreme Court should place the burden on the settling parties to show that the
settlement and any ancillary licensing agreements were within the exclusionary
scope of the patent and did not violate antitrust principles.  Further, the Court
should require that a settlement involving a large reverse payment be subject to
thorough patent examination to ensure that the settlement is not protecting an
invalid or noninfringed patent.  The proposed legislative solutions, the Preserve
Access to Affordable Generics Act and the Protecting Consumer Access to
Generic Drugs Act of 2007, should be rejected by Congress as too heavy-handed
an approach to the concerns that have arisen within the pharmaceutical industry.
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